Abstract : The interplay between politics and economics is of paramount importance in determining development results in various geographical areas. This study analyzes the interaction of political institutions, economic policies, and development results, with a specific emphasis on the impact of political stability, governance quality, and economic strategies on growth, poverty reduction, and social well-being. The paper critically examines the existing body of knowledge on the influence of political and economic elements on growth, emphasizing fundamental theories and actual evidence from different geographical areas. This article use line diagrams to visually represent the patterns and relationships between political and economic indicators and development results. The results emphasize the need of utilising integrated methodologies that take into account both political and economic aspects when developing strategies for sustainable development.
Keywords : Politics, Economics, Development Outcomes, Political Stability, Economic Policy, Governance
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